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Introduction
A cornerstone of EU energy policy is to create a well-functioning European internal market for electricity. Another fundamental objective is to transform the EU into an economy based upon a reliable and environmentally sustainable supply of energy.
To facilitate the transformation into a greener economy, the EU has imposed binding national targets for the renewable share of energy consumption, but delegates to the individual member states how to fulfill them (Directive 2009/28/EC). Electricity makes up a significant share of final energy consumption; the EU average is roughly 20 per cent.
1 To achieve the renewables targets, many EU member states thus have implemented policies to promote the production of electricity from renewable energy sources, RES-E.
RES-E support mechanisms now are main drivers of investments in new generation capacity in many countries and thereby exercise a substantial influence over electricity wholesale prices.
Prices affect not only generation and consumption, but also transmission. Network owners earn a congestion rent on buying electricity in one country and selling it at a higher price in another.
RES-E support affects the profitability of expanding transmission capacity through its effect on electricity prices and congestion rent. The capacity of cross-border transmission lines in turn determines the degree of market integration by limiting the volume of electricity trade between countries. Hence, RES-E support and market integration are linked through the electricity market.
This paper explores the connection between RES-E policies and market integration in the framework of a multinational electricity market with transmission investment. 2 A key result is that the twin goals of increased RES-E production and market integration may oppose one another when implementation is decentralized to the individual member states.
In an electricity importing country, support mechanisms such as certificates and feed-in-tariffs boost investment in domestic renewable generation and drive down the import price of electricity. This yields a positive terms-of-trade effect whereby domestic consumers obtain cheaper electricity. In an electricity exporting country, RES-E policies such as a production tax on non-renewable electricity increase the export price of electricity. This represents a positive terms-of-trade effects whereby domestic producers earn higher profit. Countries thus have incentives to implement RES-E policies for trade policy reasons even if policy makers 3 place no value on RES-E itself. Domestic policies drive down cross-border price differences and congestion rent, which lowers transmission investment and market integration.
Decentralized RES-E policies reduce overall welfare in an otherwise well-functioning market by distorting consumption, production and transmission investment. An apparent solution would be to correct distortions by imposing appropriate renewables targets on each country, as is currently done in the EU. But binding targets are insufficient to eliminate trade policy.
The electricity importing (exporting) country could suppress import (inflate export) prices, by taxing electricity consumption (non-renewable electricity production). Both countries could achieve their RES-E targets by a feed-in tariff with a cap on total revenue (price plus tariff).
Ulterior motives such as trade policy thus can explain why countries, or groups of countries in a global context, find it beneficial to implement renewables policies even when these policies seem incapable of correcting any obvious environmental or other externality. Trade policy can also explain why countries sometimes introduce multiple instruments to achieve what appears to be a single objective, RES-E production in this case.
RES-E support mechanisms, as pursued by the EU and elsewhere, largely focus on incentives to invest in renewable generation. But decentralized policies distort prices, so congestion rent underestimates the marginal social benefit of transmission. Hence, subsidies to transmission increase welfare under decentralized policy making, even if electricity prices remain distorted.
Harmonization of RES-E policies and a reduction in the set of available instruments is another way of increasing market efficiency by limiting the scope for trade policy. A possibility is to create an integrated certificate market, following the example of the joint Swedish-Norwegian certificate market. Free certificate trade improves efficiency by reallocating renewable investment to its most socially beneficial location.
The literature on RES-E policies mostly assumes away transmission constraints (e.g. Jensen and Skytte, 2002; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010; Fischer, 2010; Fischer and Preonas, 2010) , even those studying multinational markets (e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001; Morthorst, 2003; del Río, 2005; Unger and Ahlgren, 2005; Söderholm, 2008; Amundsen and Bergman, 2012) . Traber and Kemfert (2009) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the effects on prices, production, transmission investment and welfare of introducing certificates in a multinational electricity market. Section 3 analyzes RES-E targets and considers corrective policies for transmission investment in a market with positive RES-E externalities. Section 4 studies the properties of an integrated certificate market. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the robustness of the results. The analysis in the main body of the text rests upon an informal graphical exposition of the model. The full model specification and mathematical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Certificates in a multinational electricity market
Certificates, or renewable portfolio standards, are a common policy instrument for promoting production of electricity from renewable energy sources. Producers earn certificates for their renewable electricity production. Certificates are sold to retailers obliged to cover a share of sales by renewable electricity production and represent a source of income additional to the revenue producers earn on selling the electricity itself.
4 Figure 1 illustrates in a two-country model with electricity trade and transmission investment the effects of introducing a national market for certificates. The right-hand side of the figure depicts country , which imports electricity from country on the left-hand side. Production and consumption are on the horizontal axis, and the vertical axis returns the wholesale price of electricity. Electricity is competitively supplied in both countries. Let be the supply cum marginal cost curve of renewable electricity production in country . There is also a non-renewable "black" technology. To simplify the graphical exposition, I assume demand for electricity to be constant in both countries. Hence, represents the inverse residual demand for renewable electricity in country , where is total consumption, and is the supply cum marginal cost curve of domestic non-renewable electricity production. The appendix presents a formal analysis of the model under the more general assumption of price elastic aggregate demand. Restricting attention to constant aggregate demand simplifies the graphical exposition without affecting the results in any substantial way.
Gains from trade render export from country to profitable, but bottlenecks in cross-border transmission capacity prevent full price equalization. Hence, electricity is more expensive in import country than the export country even under full utilization of transmission capacity. Figure 1 The international market effects of certificates 6 marginal transmission cost equals the wholesale price difference between the two countries:
( ) . This is also the market equilibrium if transmission is competitively supplied.
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Let the import country introduce a certificate system with the purpose of increasing renewable electricity production from to . The support system for RES-E production depresses the wholesale price of electricity in the import country from to . At wholesale price , a certificate price of is required to maintain profitability of the targeted RES-E production.
The price reduction in the import country to implies that congestion rent falls as the price difference between the two markets falls: . As a result, transmission becomes less profitable and capacity drops from to . Less transmission means less trade, which in turn induces a price drop in the wholesale price from to in the export country. The introduction of a certificate system in the import country thus implies less trade and lower wholesale prices in both countries.
Introducing a certificate system in the export country lowers the wholesale price in that country from to , which in turn accentuates price differences between the two countries:
. Increased congestion rent renders network investment more profitable, resulting in increased trade between the two countries. Increased imports lower the electricity wholesale price of electricity in the importing country from to . 
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The negative effects on non-renewable electricity production follow straightforwardly from the decrease in electricity wholesale prices in both countries. As is well known, the effect of certificates on domestic RES-E supply is ambiguous (Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001) . Total electricity demand in country falls if certificates push up the retail price , where is the wholesale price and the certificate price. As RES-E is a constant share of domestic consumption, the demand reduction may be sufficient to reduce RES-E production. However, domestic RES-E supply increases if the support system is modest, so that is small or if electricity retail demand is price inelastic, as in Figure 1 .
Consider the effect on RES-E supply abroad of introducing a domestic certificate system.
Absent any foreign RES-E support, foreign RES-E is determined entirely by the foreign price of electricity. But then foreign RES-E supply must fall because the expansion of the domestic certificate system lowers electricity wholesale prices in both countries. Things are different if the foreign country already has a certificate system in place. The reduction in the wholesale price boosts electricity demand and curbs the supply of black electricity abroad. If RES-E constitutes a fixed share of consumption, then the price fall generates excess demand of RES-E abroad. This leads to an increase in the certificate price and in RES-E production abroad.
Turn next to the effect on producer and consumer surplus of a certificate system in the import country. At the lower wholesale price , it is only profitable to produce TWh RES-E in the import country absent any support system. To reach the target, domestic RES-E production must be subsidized by an amount equal to the sum of the light-coloured area A and the dotted triangle B in Figure 1 to cover the losses to RES-E production in the wholesale market. On the other hand, lower electricity wholesale prices represent a positive terms-oftrade effect on electricity imports by raising consumer surplus by the sum of A and the dark triangle C in the figure. The net effect on producer and consumer surplus in the import country is C-B, which could be positive or negative. The exporting country experiences a negative terms-of-trade effect which lowers consumer and producer surplus in the import country by an amount equal to the darker area D in Figure 1 . Total consumer and producer surplus falls by B+D-C in the two countries. In addition, congestion profit falls as a consequence of the reduction in electricity trade between the two countries. If all prices are at their competitive levels, production and transmission are supplied at marginal social cost, and demand represents the marginal social valuation of electricity consumption, this loss in total surplus represents an aggregate welfare loss on the economy. A certificate scheme in this 8 situation distorts not only production and consumption, but also transmission capacity and therefore market integration below the efficient level.
Despite its adverse effects on the economy as a whole, the import country may nonetheless have a unilateral incentive to expand the certificate system. This happens if the positive termsof-trade-effect dominates the marginal inefficiency of the support system, so that C>B and the loss in transmission profit is not too large. Introducing a certificate system is akin to policy makers in the import country exploiting trade policy to achieve favourable terms-of-trade in the international electricity market. Some trade policy is always profitable.
An electricity exporting country concerned with maximization of domestic surplus would never subsidize the production of green electricity as this would not only distort domestic production but also generate negative terms-of-trade effects. Instead, the exporting country can generate positive terms-of-trade in the electricity market by taxing the production of nonrenewable electricity or by setting a carbon price floor in a market with emissions trading.
Total surplus falls also under this alternative support scheme because of distorted production and consumption. A further implication is that market integration falls below its efficient level because of insufficient transmission investment:
Proposition 2 Countries participating in a multinational electricity market have incentives to support domestic RES-E production for trade policy reasons even if none of them attach any
value to RES-E production itself.
1. An electricity importing country can raise domestic surplus by a certificate system for renewable electricity production.
2. An electricity exporting country can raise domestic surplus by a tax on non-renewable electricity production.
In an otherwise well-functioning market, domestic RES-E support schemes a. reduce total surplus; b. induce inefficiently low transmission capacity and thereby market integration.
Proposition 2 identifies a trade-off between support mechanisms for renewable electricity and market integration under decentralized policy making. Certificates and taxes on nonrenewable electricity production are only examples of the policies countries might introduce for trade policy reasons. The general purpose of direct and indirect RES-E policies is for the 9 import (export) country to lower (raise) the import (export) electricity wholesale price. Any RES-E policy which serves this purpose will do.
Market external effects of renewable electricity production
The analysis has so far built upon the assumption that all costs and benefits of electricity production and transmission are captured by consumer and producer surplus in the electricity wholesale market. RES-E support schemes in this case reduce aggregate welfare in an otherwise well-functioning electricity market. Notwithstanding these market distortions, RES-E mechanisms are justified if there are welfare benefits to renewable electricity production not fully internalized in market prices. The most obvious externality would be positive climate effects of RES-E production. But even with an emission trading system in place aimed at internalizing climate effects of electricity production, policy makers sometimes perceive of additional benefits to RES-E neither captured by electricity prices nor by emission prices. One of them is spill-over effects from renewable technologies (Fischer and Newell, 2008) .
I add an aggregate benefit ( ) of RES-E to the model in the previous section, which is not internalized by market participants through electricity wholesale prices alone. Let ( ) be the socially optimal production of RES-E in the two countries. The positive renewables externality means that the marginal social cost of RES-E, ( ), is lower than the marginal production cost . The competitive solution thus delivers insufficient RES-E supply. The socially optimal transmission capacity is found where the marginal social cost difference of renewable electricity production equals the marginal cost of transmission:
Transmission could be over-or undersupplied at competitive equilibrium because import and export prices are distorted in the same direction.
Figure 2 illustrates a socially optimal support system. A production subsidy of ( ) in both countries financed by lump-sum transfers aligns production incentives. 6 It is not necessary to correct transmission investment because the marginal social cost of RES-E here is included in the electricity wholesale price: ( ) ( ). But sometimes it is necessary to correct also transmission at the social optimum because investments based upon congestion rent alone are distorted. An equivalent solution to a RES-E subsidy is a tax on non-renewable production, ( ), redistributed in a lump-sum manner. With taxes, the wholesale price difference ( ) ( ) does not fully capture differences in the marginal social cost of renewable electricity between countries. Instead, transmission owners should receive a congestion price corrected for taxes: .
The next question is whether decentralized policy making can implement the social optimum.
In general, the answer is no. First, increased RES-E production at home could have external effects abroad which the domestic policy maker fails to internalize. If ( ) is the market external effect of RES-E in country , then cross-border externalities arise if ⁄ .
But decentralized decision making is problematic even without cross-border externalities, i.e.
( ) ( ). For trade policy reasons, the import (export) country has an incentive to deviate from the social optimum by increasing (reducing) renewable support. Consequently, market integration falls below the social optimum. Supranational intervention is required to improve total welfare. Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) show that it could be enough to decide an appropriate renewable target for the economy as a whole and to decentralize policy making to the individual countries, if aggregate renewables are what matter to the economy: ( ) ( ). While policy makers may select polices that maximize domestic welfare, investments flow between countries in a manner which equates the marginal social cost of RES-E across countries, thereby ensuring efficiency at equilibrium. But this result relies on the assumption that policy makers treat prices as given 7 Tangerås (2013) states and proves this result in the context of direct subsidies to RES-E production financed by lump-sum transfers.
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Figure 2 A socially optimal RES-E support mechanism 
Domestic policies distort transmission investment and thereby market integration
below the social optimum.
Proposition 3 shows that increased market integration may stand in conflict with other energy policy goals of the EU, not least owing to the decentralized manner in which some of these goals are attained. National policy makers have access to a host of policy instruments for promoting RES-E such as certificates, feed-in tariffs and direct investment support. Taxes on non-renewable electricity production and consumption are other standard tools in the policy maker's toolbox. This plethora of instruments leaves ample room for national policy makers to pursue objectives unrelated to the environment, to renewable electricity production or to energy efficiency. For example, an electricity importing country can suppress electricity prices and improve its terms-of-trade by taxing electricity consumption. A corresponding increase in subsidies to RES-E production allows the country to meet its national renewables target even at lower electricity prices. An electricity exporting country can raise the electricity price and thus improve its terms-of-trade by taxing non-renewable electricity production. The policy maker can neutralize any incentive to overinvest in renewable electricity by lowering renewables subsidies. One such instrument is a feed-in tariff with a cap on total revenues which fully offsets profit increases resulting from taxes on non-renewable electricity.
Trade policy disguised as renewable policy distorts market integration below the social optimum because inefficiently high (low) export (import) prices reduce congestion rent, hence the profitabily of transmission investment. One way to offset the negative consequences of domestic policies would be to strengthen market integration by subsidizing transmission investment. Consider a transfer on top of congestion rent, financed by a lump-sum tax on electricity consumers in the two countries: 
An integrated certificate market
The joint Swedish and Norwegian certificate market opened in 2012 and was the world's first multinational certificate market. In this market a consumer fulfills her quota obligation either by purchasing Norwegian or Swedish certificates. Perfect substitutability between certificates and zero trade costs imply a uniform certificate price in the two countries. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of certificate market integration, starting from a situation with two autarkic certificate markets. Initially, country produces TWh renewable electricity at wholesale price and certificate price . Excess demand at price is covered by T TWh imports from country , which produces TWh renewable electricity at wholesale price and certificate price . Transmission capacity is at the competitive level: ( ).
8 The Renewables Grid Initiative argues in a note to the DG budget that public cofunding at the EU level would facilitate investment in cross-border capacity and thereby increase market integration (http://renewablesgrid.eu/documents/position-papers.html), June 10, 2013). Proposition 4 shows that cofounding could be efficient. 9 In the proof of Proposition 4, I show that domestic policy makers distort prices for any . 10 See Tangerås (2013) for the proof of this statement.
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Assume that the two countries integrate their certificate markets. Certificate trade drives down the certificate price in country and raises the certificate price in country until the price is equalized in both countries and the certificate market clears at . Under the assumption of price inelastic electricity demand (this is for expositional purposes only), the relative price change of certificates drives up renewable electricity production by in country with a corresponding reduction in country . As a consequence, the wholesale price of electricity falls from to in the export country and increases from to in the import country. The increased price difference raises congestion rent which triggers network investment. Exports increase to (not indicated in the figure) , where ( ).
If, on the other hand, the certificate price initially is comparatively lower in the importing country, , then certificate market integration increases (lowers) renewable electricity production in the import (export) country. This reallocation of renewable production from the exporting country to the importing country drives down price differences between the two markets, which in turn reduce trade and market integration:
Proposition 5 If the electricity exporting (importing) country possesses a comparative advantage in the production of renewable electricity, then certificate market integration increases (lowers) transmission investment and thereby electricity market integration.
Certificate market integration raises total surplus in the electricity wholesale market.
Certificate trade implies that the production inefficiency associated with electricity certificates falls in country by the scratched area in the right-hand side of Figure 3 , but increases in country by the scratched area on the left-hand side. The net effect is positive. Figure 3 Certificate market integration g E 14 to common belief, e.g. Söderholm (2008) and Schmalensee (2012) , efficiency of an integrated certificate market does not imply equalization of renewable marginal production costs across the market. Hence, one could not draw the conclusion that integrated certificate markets were inefficient based simply upon an observation that marginal costs of renewable electricity production differ across the market. In Figure 3 , renewable electricity is produced at marginal cost in the import country at the social optimum, which is higher than the marginal cost of renewable electricity in the export country. Under certificate market autarky, the certificate price measures the marginal deadweight loss in the electricity market associated with renewable electricity support in the import country because is the difference between the marginal production cost of green electricity and the marginal production cost of black electricity. Similarly, represents the marginal deadweight loss of renewable electricity support in the export country. Certificate market integration increases efficiency by equating the marginal deadweight loss of renewable electricity across markets:
. Marginal production costs are equalized if and only if wholesale prices are the same in all markets. But transmission capacity is costly, so bottlenecks generally prevent full equalization of electricity wholesale prices at the social optimum.
Certificate market integration induces a reallocation of renewable electricity investment to the country with the lowest certificate price in autarky. In Figure 3 , RES-E production increases by in country and falls by the same amount in country under integration. Aggregate RES-E production may generally decrease with certificate market integration and render it more difficult to attain an aggregate production target . If the distribution of RES-E investments matters, i.e. ( ) ( ), then differentiated certificate prices are required at social optimum. Full integration of certificate markets is suboptimal in that case.
Certificate market integration thus may entail a trade-off between higher efficiency in the electricity wholesale market and the achievement of aggregate and national RES-E targets.
Discussion
This paper investigates the interplay between decentralized support policies for renewable electricity production, RES-E, and market integration in a multinational electricity market and derives a number of testable predictions. In particular, electricity importing countries have incentives to implement policies which serve to lower the import price of electricity, such as subsidies to RES-E or consumption taxes. Electricity exporting countries benefit from policies which raise export prices, such as taxes on non-renewable electricity production. A driving force behind the EU Renewables Directive was a concern with resource adequacy. At an aggregate level, model predictions are consistent with EU promoting renewable energy to reduce import dependence of natural gas from Russia.
The analysis rests upon the assumption that generation and transmission are competitively supplied. Most electricity markets are concentrated and therefore susceptible to the exercise of market power; see Wolfram (1999) or Borenstein et al. (2002) for classical treaties. Domestic transmission networks often are owned by one or several transmission network operators (TSOs) subject to regulation. But main predictions of the model appear robust to changes in market performance. For example, subsidies tend to increase RES-E investment and thereby reduce electricity prices even under imperfect competition. Lower congestion rent would have a negative effect on transmission investment even under regulation. 11 A pro-competitive effect of market integration arises under imperfect competition because transmission bottlenecks limit competition (Holmberg and Philpott, 2012) . This additional externality suggests that distortions of market integration associated with domestic RES-E policies are equally and perhaps even more substantial under imperfect product market competition.
The empirical predictions are derived in a two-country model with unidirectional electricity trade. In reality, electricity often flows in both directions over the course of a year to balance local demand and supply fluctuations. Countries usually have more than one trading partner, exporting electricity to one country while importing it from another. The overall incentive to subsidize renewable production or tax non-renewable production depends on net trade flows and the sensitivity of electricity prices to domestic policy changes. If, for example, net traded volume is zero, but imports to the home country are less price sensitive than exports, then the home country still benefits from subsidies to RES-E. To test the model predictions one would first have to construct an appropriate electricity trade index.
The model relies upon the assumption that decentralized policies maximize domestic welfare:
policy makers attach equal weight to consumer and producer surplus within the country. The electricity intensive industry and other consumer groups usually lobby for lower electricity prices. Producers benefit from higher electricity prices, and one would not be surprised to see power companies with a large portfolio of renewable production lobbying in favour of taxes 16 on dirty technologies. Energy policy depends also on the lobbying efforts of these and other interest groups. Jenner et al. (2012) analyze the political determinants of RES-E support in the EU. They find a long presence of a chapter of the International Solar Energy Association to increase the likelihood of RES-E support in that country. The authors do not consider the link between trade flows an RES-E policy. In light of the results of the present analysis, this might prove a fruitful venue for future empirical research on the determinants of RES-E policy.
Appendix
This Appendix formally analyzes the model which the analysis in the main text rests upon.
There are two countries, the export country, indexed by , and the import country, indexed by . The representative consumer in country purchases TWh electricity to maximize quasi-linear utility ( ) ( ) , where is the electricity wholesale price, the quota obligation and the certificate price in country . The utility function ( ) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, with ( ) .
Indirect utility is ( ) ( ) ( ) . Define electricity demand in country by ( ). There are two types of electricity production in country , renewable or "green" electricity in amount and non-renewable or "black" electricity in amount , with respective cost functions ( ) and ( ). Both cost functions are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex with ( ) and ( ) . The profit of the two types of production are ( ) ( ) and ( ), respectively. Electricity is exported from to in amount , where is the capacity of the cross-border interconnection between and . Congestion profit equals ( ) ( ), where ( ) is the strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex cost of providing transmission, with ( ) .
Assume that electricity and transmission are both competitively supplied. The set of firstorder conditions ( ):
plus the set of market-clearing conditions
define the unique interior equilibrium under the assumption of no certificate trade between the two countries.
Proof of Proposition 1
By total differentiation of the equilibrium conditions above ( ):
is similarly defined, and
The comparative statics above reveal that the electricity wholesale price at home is strictly decreasing in the quota obligation at home and abroad.
Evaluating the effects of the support system on non-renewable electricity is straightforward.
Bearing in mind the first-order condition ( ) and the price effects ⁄ and
Hence, the supply of non-renewable electricity is decreasing in the quota obligations independently of whether the increase is at home or abroad.
Consider next the real effects of the certificate system on transmission capacity. Using ( ) and the price effects above, I obtain after simplifications ( ):
As is readily apparent, transmission capacity and trade are lower (higher) if the quota obligation in the importing (exporting) country is higher ( ⁄ and ⁄ ).
Consider next the effect on RES-E production. It is useful to study the effect on the certificate price. The effect on the domestic certificate price of an increase in the own quota obligation
is ambiguous in general, but positive if electricity demand is inelastic or the support system is small enough ( is small):
However, the domestic certificate price is strictly increasing in the quota obligation abroad:
Invoking the first-order condition ( ), I obtain
which is ambiguous, but strictly positive if, for example, electricity demand is inelastic or the support system is small enough.
I need to consider separately the case of RES-E support systems from the case without RES-E support when analyzing the predicted effects on renewable electricity production abroad. If there exists a certificate system abroad, then
by the market clearing condition ( ). Absent any RES-E support abroad, equilibrium renewable production is characterized by the first-order condition ( ).
By necessity, ⁄ because ⁄ . Note finally that the domestic retail price is ambiguous to changes in the own quota obligation:
But as is also well known, the retail price is increasing in the own quota obligation if either the certificate price is high, the quota obligation is large, the supply of renewable electricity is inelastic ( is large) or the supply of non-renewable electricity is elastic ( is small), i.e.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that all domestic electricity production is owned by domestic firms and that country earns a share of congestion profit. Surplus in country is the sum of domestic consumer surplus, domestic firm profit and the country's share of congestion profit:
where I for notational simplicity have subsumed the fact that prices, production and transmission capacity all depend on ( ) at competitive equilibrium. By repeated use of the envelope theorem on consumer surplus, producer and transmission profits, and the market clearing conditions , ( ) and Surplus in the export country unambiguously falls with increases in the quota obligations at home and abroad ( ⁄ and ⁄ ). Therefore, a policy maker in the export country aiming to increase domestic surplus would never introduce certificates. To the contrary, national surplus would increase by a RES-E support scheme implemented through a tax on non-renewable electricity; see Tangerås (2013) .
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Subsidies to renewable electricity production in the import country and taxes on nonrenewable electricity production in the export country reduce the difference below what maximizes total surplus. As transmission capacity (market integration) is monotonically increasing in , the unilateral pursuit of domestically optimal renewable electricity support schemes implies inefficiently low market integration. ■
Implementation of the social optimum
The benevolent social planner maximizes The social optimum equates the marginal social cost of production across technologies in both countries: ( ) ( ) ( ). Optimal transmission capacity is at the point at which marginal transmission cost equals the difference in marginal social production cost of renewable electricity production between the import and the export country: ( )
The social optimum can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with subsidies to renewable production financed by lump-sum taxation of electricity consumers. A wholesale price of , a renewable production subsidy of ( ) and the socially optimal allocations solve the first-order conditions for production and transmission and clear the electricity markets in both countries. With renewable production subsidies alone, competitive transmission supply is socially optimal: ( ) . Given subsidies and , firms produce the socially optimal shares of renewable production 21 An equivalent solution to subsidizing renewables is to tax non-renewable production by ( ), let renewable production receive the wholesale price ( ) and redistribute tax revenue to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Under this alternative support mechanism, consumers pay the net wholesale price, , and the owners of transmission receive a congestion price corrected for taxes: .
Proof of Proposition 3
Let ( ) ( ) ( ). If, for example, welfare in country equals
at the social optimum, where ( ), then the policy maker of that country is indifferent between all national policies which implement the social optimum. The reason is that domestic welfare then depends entirely on the allocations ( ), ( ) and . I only need to show that national policy makers have a unilateral incentive to deviate from some socially optimal policy to establish incentive incompatibility of decentralized decision making in this case. Let the default policy be the renewable production subsidy ( ) with wholesale price financed by the lump-sum transfer .
Fix renewables production at ( ). Assume that country applies a combination of a nonrenewables production tax and renewables production subsidy to attain its renewable target . Country uses a mix of a consumption tax and renewables production subsidy to reach its target . Both countries balance their budgets by lumpsum net transfers to electricity consumers. Assume that transmission investment is subsidized at the central level by , the cost of which is redistributed across countries in a lump-sum fashion according to the distribution of transmission ownership shares. To simplify analysis, assume that domestic policies and are set simultaneously.
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Define electricity demand ( ) and ( ). The first-order conditions
and market-clearing conditions
uniquely define equilibrium wholesale prices ( ), non-renewable production ( ) and transmission as functions of ( ). Given the equilibrium price , the policy maker in country sets the production subsidy residually to implement the country's renewables target:
( ) . By uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium and the social optimum, these policies implement the social optimum if and only if .
By total differentiation of the equilibrium conditions:
Thus, electricity wholesale prices in both countries ( ) are decreasing in the consumption tax ( ⁄ ) and increasing in the non-renewables production tax ( ⁄ ). The domestic effect is stronger than the foreign effect, so the price difference is falling in both policies:
Thus, transmission capacity is falling in both policies: ⁄ and ⁄ . Finally,
imply that a higher consumption tax in country leads to lower non-renewable production in both countries ( ⁄ ) and lower (higher) consumption in the import (export) country:
. Consumption in both countries fall with increases in the nonrenewables production tax in country ( ⁄ ), while "black" production increases (falls) in the import (export) country:
The marginal effect on welfare
in country of increasing the consumption tax is given by 
Proof of Proposition 4
Summarize the domestic welfare effects to get the aggregate welfare effect By straightforward differentiation of the first-order conditions (3) and (4):
Hence, it is socially optimal to raise above zero if and . ■
Proof of Proposition 5
To analyze the effects of certificate market integration, consider the homotopy ( ) , where is the equilibrium certificate price under autarky implicitly defined by (1) and (2), is the equilibrium certificate price under integration defined by the first-order 24 conditions in (1), the market clearing condition for non-renewable electricity in (2), all modified by , plus the aggregate renewable electricity market clearing condition
The parameter is a measure of market integration where refers to integration and represents autarky. In this case ( ): Consider the welfare effects. Define quasi-surplus
as a function of market integration . Utilize the first-order and market-clearing conditions:
Summarizing over countries yields
To move further, the following comparative statics result will be useful:
After some tedious, but straightforward arithmetic:
The above expression is strictly positive by the assumption that with at least one strict inequality. Hence, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for all . By the same token, ( ) ( ) for all owing to ( ) ( ). Hence, ̃ ( ) and surplus therefore strictly higher under certificate market integration than autarky.■
